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ABSTRACT
This study examines the role of CEO’s gender, power and ownership on 
audit report lag. The rapid changes of market regulations and societal norms 
make CEO’s characteristics emerge as evolving risk factors for corporate 
governance and audit research. This raises the importance for research 
to understand their dynamic influences on corporate financial disclosure 
quality specifically, timeliness. This study hypothesises that different CEO’s 
characteristics set different tones to the audit discussion in the boardroom. 
To test the hypothesis, this study uses multiple secondary data from 
Compustat, Audit Analytics Execucomp and BoardEX and STATA analytical 
solution. The CEO’s characteristics are divided into three dimensions that 
measure gender diversity, power and ownership concentration. This study 
provides evidence that both CEO’s ownership and power, which proxied 
by (1) industrial experience and (2) social network size are significantly 
associated with audit report lag. However, only the association with the 
CEO’s power reduces audit report lag whereas CEO’s ownership increases 
it. With regards to the gender diversity, it is only effective in reducing audit 
report lag if other CEO’s characteristics are also presence. Overall, the 
results provide support to the study proposition in respect of the role of 
CEO’s characteristics in accelerating financial reporting timeliness.
Keywords: Board, Gender Diversity, CEO Gender, CEO Power, CEO 
Ownership, CEO Characteristics, Corporate Governance and Audit Report 
Lag.
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the relationship between the CEO’s gender, power, 
ownership and audit report lag. Audit report lag is the number of days 
between the firm’s financial year end and the signing of the audit reports 
(Ashton, Willingham, & Elliott, 1987; Bamber, Bamber, & Schoderbek, 
1993; Boshoff & Wesson, 2019). In the US, specifically since 2006, there 
has been a significant pressure for the higher revenue issuers1 to meet the 60 
days deadline for the filing of the audited annual 10-K with the Securities 
of Exchange Commission. This does not only provide incentives for firms 
and auditors to observe for shorter audit report lags since most firms prefer 
to release the audited earnings report to the public (Bamber et al., 1993), 
but also for researchers to obtain understanding about the variations that 
explain audit report lag (Knechel & Payne, 2001). With the increasing new 
regulations and pressures from social movements (Deloitte, 2015; Azmat, 
2019), it is expected to for the management and its board to develop different 
dynamic. This raises the question whether CEO’s characteristics influences 
audit report lag differently under this new dynamic.
The higher scrutiny on audit report lag is consistent with its established 
association with market reactions subsequent to the accounting earnings 
announcement (Chambers & Penman, 1984; Byard & Shaw, 2003; He, 
Sidhu, & Taylor, 2019). Historically, US SEC requires for high revenue 
issuers to submit their audited financial reports (Form 10-K) within 90 
days from the end of financial year, but this deadline has been shortened 
to 75 days in 2003 and 60 days in 2006. Empirical evidence from prior 
research indicates that financial reporting timeliness is highly important, 
as implied by the positive relation between earnings news announcement 
and the magnitude of analysts’ forecast revisions and the abnormal returns 
(Byard & Shaw, 2003; He et al., 2019), and the effects of timely earnings 
announcement in maximising information transfer and reducing losses 
(Han & Wild., 1997; Knechel & Payne, 2001). Several studies have also 
documented findings, which imply market finds audited financial reports 
to have higher credibility (Dedman & Kausar, 2012; He et al., 2019). Thus, 
1 US SEC describes higher revenue issuers as (1) accelerated filers (firms with publicly-owned 
outstanding shares of $75 million or more, but less than $700 million) and (2) large accelerated 
filers (firms with publicly-owned outstanding shares held of US$700 million or more, as of the last 
business day of its most recently completed second fiscal quarter. These thresholds however, have 
been proposed for amendment in 2019.
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the longer audit report lags of the firm, the more likely for the outsiders to 
interpret it as a bad signal.
The large bulk of audit report lag research is focusing on examining 
the monitoring cost-side such as corporate governance structure and 
auditor-specific attributes (Schwartz & Soo, 1996; Albernathy, Barnes, Chad 
Stefaniak, & Alexandria Weisbarth, 2017). This study asserts the importance 
of examining the link between CEO’s heterogenous characteristics and audit 
report lag. Other than the firm-related risk factors, the CEO’s characteristics 
can provide good insights particularly on the CEO’s risk preferences and 
tolerance margin that greatly influence the executive decision whether to 
accept, reject or negotiate audit adjustment recommended by the auditor. 
The CEO sits at the top decision-making pyramid in any profit-making 
organisation. This naturally, would earn them greater advantage in setting 
the overall tone of audit discussion in the boardroom. This study aims to 
examine the CEO’s individual characteristics specifically, in gender, power 
and ownership dimensions to predict their risk-taking preferences in relation 
to timelier issuance of audited and earnings reports.
The CEO’s characteristics selected for this study comprised of three 
dimensions: (1) gender, (2) power and (3) ownership stake or concentration. 
Until recently, the boardroom provides more of fraternity vibe (Byrne, 
Clarke, & Meer, 2005). However, there has been a growing external 
pressure for firms to increase women participation in corporate board as 
part of creating healthier gender-balanced board (Deloitte, 2015). This 
consequently, leads to this study’s interest to explore on the role of gender 
diversity to gain better insights of its association with audit report lag. The 
power dimension of the CEO is measured by the industrial experience and 
social network size. Prior research finds that experience rate tends to create 
expertise (Pornpitakpan, 2004) and the size of social network is likely to 
build supports (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Both of which can inspire higher 
cooperation from others (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Pornpitakpan, 2004). 
The third dimension of the CEO characteristics is the CEO’s ownership 
concentration. It is expected that having certain percentage of stake in 
the firm would positively influence the CEO’s decision making under 
uncertainty (Mitra, Hossain, & Marks, 2012). 
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This study has several contributions. Firstly, this study provides 
evidence that individually, gender diversity is less likely to have effect 
on audit lag report. However, when it is in combination with other CEO’s 
characteristics, it reduces audit report lag. Further, this study finds that 
the higher industrial experience and the bigger social network size, the 
shorter audit report lag. Though, the association are noticeably stronger 
for the industrial experience. The positive effects of CEO’s power for both 
industrial experience and social network size are robust to whether or not 
they exist as an individual factor or in combination. In contrast to other 
CEO’s characteristics, CEO’s ownership concentration is increasing the 
audit report lag. Lastly, this study finds evidence that provides insights on the 
role of board diversity (using nationality mix) in reducing audit report lag.
This paper adds to current literature of audit report lag and CEO 
characteristics. In particular, it adds to the growing literature that have been 
documenting the effect of female leader towards increasing the governance 
dynamic and financial-related performance (Byrne et al., 2005; Ferreira, 
2010; Khan & Vieito, 2013; Harjoto, Laksmana, & Lee, 2015). While 
evidence from prior research in relation to the women participation in 
leadership and board roles have been mixed, this study sheds some lights 
the importance of not studying the factor as an individual determinant. 
This study in particular, extends the work of Harjoto et al. (2015) which 
investigate gender diversity on audit report lag by providing wider data range 
of 15 years. This study also contributes to the audit report lag literature by 
examining industrial expertise and social network as additional dimensions 
to measuring credibility arising from expertise other than simply using the 
CEO’s tenure. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II discusses 
prior literature review and hypotheses development. Section III details the 
research methodology including sample formation and the empirical model. 
Section IV describes the descriptive statistics and discussion of results of 
regression, and analyses. Section V provides the summary of the study.
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Audit report lag determines the timing of the firm’s financial disclosure and 
subsequently, the perception of its usefulness. Audit report lag is the number 
of days that elapses between the end of financial year and the date, in which 
the audited financial statements is signed (Ho-Young, Mande, & Son, 2009). 
Audit report lag tends to affect the financial reporting timeliness because 
most firms prefer to use the audited financial reports when announcing their 
earnings to the public for better effects (Bamber et al., 1993; Byard & Shaw, 
2003). Sometimes, they would even use the same audited financial reports 
(Form 10-K) that have been filed with the US SEC (Bamber et al., 1993). 
In 2006, the US SEC requires the large accelerated firms with revenues 
range of US$700 million or more, to submit the audited annual 10-K within 
the 60 days from their financial year end (US Securities of Exchange 
Commission, 2009). The accelerated filers, which are the firms with lower 
revenues margin from US$75 million to less than US$700 million are 
required to file their 10-Ks within 75 days (US Securities of Exchange 
Commission, 2009). The stricter ruling with the 10-K filing clearly conveys 
the US SEC’s position about having firms practicing financial disclosure 
timeliness. Consequently, this increases the importance of audit report lag 
research to understand its associated risk factors associated in effort to 
improve audit process and financial reporting timeliness.
Timeliness, is one of the four major qualitative characteristics that 
enhances the financial reporting information quality (Financial Accounting 
Standard Board, 2010). The production of the financial reporting quality is 
unobservable to the users other than to the management. Therefore, users 
are tempted to use proxies such as audit report lag to infer about auditor’s 
perceived risk of the firm’s financial reporting quality. In specific, its 
timeliness aspect. From audit report lag, the inferred signal is predominantly 
as an indicator of audit efficiency (Bamber et al., 1993) or problematic 
audit (Blankley, Hurtt, & MacGregor, 2015). Recently, Blankley, Hurtt, and 
MacGregor (2015) find evidence to suggest that audit report lag contains 
information about future restatement. This finding by Blankley et al. (2015), 
not only provides support to the proponents who argued audit report lag 
serves as a good measure for problematic audit, but it is also incremental 
in predicting future risk attached to the current financial reporting.
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Delaying earnings announcement reduces financial reporting 
usefulness significantly by making it losing the relevance in influencing 
users’ decision-makings (Financial Accounting Standard Board, 2010). 
Prior research that investigated market reactions find evidence that early 
release of earnings information provides positive price reactions (Chambers 
& Penman, 1984). Using the economic model of information asymmetry, 
Easley and O’hara (2004) show that investors are more likely to yield better 
returns with publicly available information, which stresses the importance 
for firms to release timely financial reports. Prior research also find evidence 
that failure to release timely earnings news can cost firms in terms of 
allowing other sources to benefit from private information (Chambers 
& Penman, 1984).The benefits of monitoring the timeliness of financial 
reporting also extends to improving analysts’ earnings forecasts. He et al. 
(2019) and Byard and Shaw (2003) find that analysts place greater weight 
to the publicly available audited earnings report than the private information 
when analysts are shown to revise their future earnings forecast shortly after 
the earnings announcement. All these have led the US SEC to place high 
emphasise on financial reporting timeliness. 
The CEO’s Characteristics
In most context of audit report lag research, the CEO’s characteristics 
are often treated as a homogenous factor. If this is true, it does not explain 
the theory of wage-efficiency, which is applied in the existing labour 
market. The theory of the wage-efficiency explains that different levels of 
talents should affect the differences in wages exchanged as well (Akerlof, 
1984). This suggests that the CEO’s characteristics should then influence 
different outcomes, depending on their abilities and talents. Further, this 
provides support to this study which argues there is a value in studying the 
differences in the CEO’s characteristics and their differential effects on the 
audit report lag, which is the determinant of financial reporting timeliness. 
The theory of the firm holds that it is most optimal for the profit-
making organisation to hire professional talent, the manager, to generate 
earnings for the business owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). By separating 
the control and ownership rights, the theorists expect for the manager to 
balance the business owners’ risk-averse behaviour. Perhaps, it is later then 
they have realised that the managers’ risk preferences tend to vary according 
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to individuals. The separation of control and ownership framework opens 
to another set of problem- the agency problem, which have had occupy the 
researchers for centuries discussing its probable solutions. Agency cost is the 
cost that the business owners have to incur in order to curb the managers’ 
undesirable behaviours that would deviate them from serving their intended 
roles, which is creating wealth for the business owners  (Healy & Palepu., 
2001). The extent to which the CEO would best serve their management 
roles might relate to their risk preferences, which are projections of their 
personal traits or characteristics.
Worldwide, women participation in the boardroom is one of the 
leading business chatters today. US used to have more seats held by the 
female directors (Ferreira, 2010). Currently, Europe has been taking lead by 
requiring 40 per cent quota for women seats in corporate board (Sweigart, 
2012). Some research find evidence to lend supports on the effectiveness 
of having women participation in boardroom. For example, Lakhal, Aguir, 
Lakhal, and Malek (2015) examine female CEOs in France and they find 
that they are associated with less earnings management. Khan and Vieito 
(2013) examine the relationship between the female CEO and the firm’s 
performance and they find that the female CEO is linked to lower firm’s 
risk level. 
However, there are other studies, which find evidence against the 
benefits of having higher women participation. For example, Azmat (2019) 
finds that the firm value is decreasing as the number of seats held by the 
female directors increasing. Though, Azmat (2019) further argued that 
while higher women participation is shown to have less impact on the firm’s 
value, it has a positive influence in diversifying the risk preferences in the 
boardroom since the female leaders are typically risk-averse. Given the 
different findings relating to the female leader’s performance, it is unclear 
whether female CEOs would make a different impact than their male 
colleagues. The female leader while they have been argued to be risk-averse 
than their male colleagues, it has a double-edge sword. As a risk-averse 
person, a female CEO might be more defensive towards accepting auditor 
recommendations for adjustments in efforts to protect their future career 
prospect. Considering the mixed evidence from prior research subsequently, 
this study hypothesises:
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H1: The presence of female CEO is associated with audit report lag.
The economic theoretical models of economics show that as the CEO’s 
skills increasing so does the size of their compensation (Akerlof, 1984). This 
suggests that industrial experience, can serve as one the potential factors 
that drive the perceived competency of the CEO. Prior research would 
typically use the CEO’s age and tenure ship to determine expertise (Baker 
& Hall, 2004). However, the breadth of source credibility literature works 
has been discussing on the significance of training experience in influencing 
credibility (Pornpitakpan, 2004). 
Prior audit research shows there are correlation between higher auditor 
industry specialisation and audit quality (Teoh & Wong, 1993; He et al., 
2019). Similarly, board of directors’ financial background or expertise have 
been shown to improve their monitoring qualities (Rubin & Segal, 2019). 
In more relevant study, Gounopoulos, Loukopoulos, and Loukopoulos 
(2019) find that the CEO’s educational level and quality reflect their ability 
to raise capital for the firms. While large of the research is dominated by 
the importance of monitoring CEOs behaviour from managing earnings, 
this study argues that the CEOs might behave differently when they have 
the relevant and sufficient expertise to match the industry, in which they 
are working. Uygur (2018) finds that CEOs with higher ability is more 
likely to be more transparent in attempt to signal their expertise. Hence 
this suggests that the CEOs with industrial expertise are more likely to be 
more professional and diligent in addressing the audit issues, which have 
been raised by the auditors. Subsequently, has the potential to expedite the 
audit process and shorten the audit report lag.
Social network size works differently in building the CEO’s bargaining 
power. Social network relies on the CEO’s personalities and persona. Larger 
social networking will provide the CEOs with greater support and bargaining 
power, which they can assert on others. However, supports generally begets 
supports (Palazzo & Scherer, 2008). Research from psychological and social 
science provide evidence that a show of willingness to cooperate inspires 
others to reciprocate positively (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Thus, it is hardly to 
expect for CEOs with large network size to be less cooperative with others, 
including the auditors. Consider arguments on both industrial experience 
and social network size, the second hypothesis is proposed:
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H2: The CEO’s power is negatively associated with audit report lag.
The older the earnings news, the less likely for users to perceived it 
is as useful (Financial Accounting Standard Board, 2010). This provides 
incentives for the CEOs to cooperate with the auditors to help expedite 
the audit work, including positively responding to the proposed audit 
adjustments and concerns raised in the management letter. However, since 
audit adjustments tend to signal poor performance or lack of managerial 
abilities to the shareholders, the CEOs might be reluctant to provide their 
easy approvals. In particular, adjustments that would likely to lower the 
firm’s earnings. Thus, it is expected for the CEO’s aggression to increase 
as their wealth (pay and bonuses) depending on it. However, it could be 
a different matter altogether if the CEO has a certain level of stake in the 
firm, as represented through managerial stocks. The CEOs might be more 
inspired to accelerate financial reporting timeliness to extract the benefits 
from the timely issuance of audited earnings report to the public. 
Mitra et al. (2012) find that managerial shareholding works as effective 
as other stock-governance ownership such as institutional ownership, 
which leads to timely responds in internal control weaknesses remedial. 
However, it is difficult to determine the optimal threshold for the managerial 
shareholding, in which such behaviours would likely to materialise. In 
addition, there is a possibility that when the CEOs have higher stake in the 
firm, they are likely to develop incentives similar to the business owners. 
They would develop incentives to report good earnings in attempt to raise 
external financing (Healy & Palepu., 2001). Holding a managerial position 
only provides them greater informational advantages to manipulate the 
earnings report to work towards their benefits. Thus, the third hypothesis 
is expressed as follows:
H3: The CEO’s ownership is associated with audit report lag.
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METHODOLOGY
Sample Formation
This study uses sample of US firms that spans the period of 15 years 
from 2000 – 2014. The sample is a merged result between Compustat, Audit 
Analytics, Execucomp and BoardEX databases. The financial variables 
are collected from Compustat, which is a database that provides long date 
range of US firms’ financial data.2 Audit-related variables are extracted from 
Audit Analytics. The CEO and board-related variables are obtained from 
both Execucomp and BoardEX. BoardEX has a wider data range than the 
Execucomp, but it is necessary to combine it with the data from Execucomp 
in order to increase the probability of data matching accuracy. Execucomp 
uses firm id that identical to the id used in Compustat and Audit Analytics. 
Further, Execucomp covers only S&P 500 firms, which can reduce the initial 
data collected from Compustat and Audit Analytics significantly. The data 
merging between the Execucomp and BoardEX reduces the risk of having 
smaller sample size. After excluding firms with missing required variables, 
the final sample reports 18,921 firm-years observation. No exclusion has 
been made for financial sector, as audit report lag is applicable across 
industries whether or not they are regulated. This method is consistent with 
Knechel and Payne (2001) and Harjoto et al. (2015)
Measuring CEO Characteristics 
The variables of interest of this study are CEO gender, power and 
ownership. The CEO gender, GENDER is categorical in nature, sets equal 
to 1 if the CEO is female and 0 if the CEO is male (e.g. Manner, 2010; 
Khan & Vieito, 2013). This variable is generated from a string variable 
from BoardEX, which informs the gender type of the CEO. The second 
CEO’s characteristics, CEO’s Power, is measured using two dimensions: 
(1) industrial expertise, IND_EXP and (2) social network size, NETWORK_
SIZE. Prior research has used proxies such as education qualification and 
tenure ship to proxy for the CEO’s expertise (Gounopoulos et al., 2019 ). 
However, this study argues that industrial experience is often overlooked 
by the prior research when it has the potential to build strong expertise 
2 The initial data collection is from 1998 – 2014, but both 1998 and 1999 are dropped because 
of the low number data available for testing. Additional analysis indicates that the inclusion 
of both years does not affect the results from the main analyses.
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credentials for the CEO as much as qualification and tenure. Bhattacharya, 
Kao, and Li (2019, Forthcoming) use both dimensions to capture the CEO’s 
experience. In this study, the industrial experience variable is divided to 
two-tier level of expertise, 1 if they have 5 years or more in the industry 
and 0 for otherwise. The second dimension to the CEO’s power is the 
CEO’s social network size. The number of the CEO’s social network is 
identified from the network variable in BoardEX. The third variables of 
interest, the CEO ownership concentration, OWN is determined by the 
CEO’s shareholding percentage (Baek, Johnson, & Kim, 2009). This study 
selects the CEO’s shareholding with a threshold of 5 percent or more, to for 
proxy for significant stake for the CEO to be concerned with the financial 
reporting timeliness. 
Empirical Model
The relationship between CEO’s characteristics and audit report lag 
is estimated in the model described as following:
 AUD_LAG = GENDER + POWER + OWN + ROA + LOSS + 
INVREC + BOARD_SIZE + BOARD_DIVERSITY + BIG4 + 
AUD_CHANGE + AUD_TENURE + LN_NAS + G_CONCERN + 
RESTATE + BUSY_SEASON + ε             (1)
The dependent variable, AUD_LAG is the audit report lag. The audit 
report lag is measured using the number of days computed from the date 
of financial year end to the signed date of the audited financial reports. The 
independent variables, CEO’s characteristics are measured using gender, 
power and ownership concentration. The CEO’s gender, GENDER is sets 
equal to 1 if the CEO is male and 0 if otherwise. The second variables 
of interest, CEO’s power is measured using the CEO’s: (1) industrial 
experience, IND_EXP and (2) network size NETWORK SIZE. Both CEO’s 
industrial experience and tenure ship have been set equals to 1 if they pass 
a threshold of 5 years and more and 0 if otherwise. The third aspect of 
CEO’s characteristics is the ownership concentration, OWN. The CEO’s 
ownership is sets equal to 1 if the CEO has an ownership 5 per cent or more 
and 0 if otherwise. 
256
MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING REVIEW, VOLUME 18 NO. 2, AUGUST 2019
The hypotheses of this study rely on the relationship between the 
CEO’s characteristics and the perceived risk associated with having longer 
audit report lag. Thus, control variables included in the empirical model 
follows prior research, which have documented their associations with audit 
report lag. The control variables are discussed in the following section.
Control Variables
The control variables for the audit report lag model have been 
established and examined by prior research (Bamber et al., 1993; Schwartz 
& Soo, 1996; Knechel & Payne, 2001; Ho-Young et al., 2009; Blankley 
et al., 2015; Albernathy et al., 2017). Typically, the control variables in 
the empirical model of audit report lag are divided into three categories: 
client, board and auditor-specific risk factors. The client-specific risk factors 
comprised of profitability ratio (ROA), earnings losses (LOSS) and firm’s 
complexity (INVREC). Using return on asset as a proxy for profitability 
performance has twice of benefits. Not only that it is more stable measure, 
it also acts as performance matching for sample firms (Kothari, Leone, & 
Wasley, 2005). Prior research finds that on average, profitability is likely to 
have positive effect on audit report lag (Habib, Bhuiyan, Huang, & Miah, 
2019). In contrast, evidence from prior research indicates that financial 
loss and complexity of the firm tend to increase audit report lag (Bamber 
et al., 1993). 
For board-specific risk factors, board size, BOARD_SIZE and 
nationality mix ratio, BOARD_DIVERSITY is used as proxies. The board size 
is rather a common feature for large firms, but it does not necessarily suggest 
governance quality. Large board size can cost a firm in a form of decision-
making efficiency, but it is one of the effective governance mechanisms 
known to combat managerial power (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). 
Nationality mix ratio is one of the rich features in corporate governance, 
yet largely unexamined in prior research. This is reasonable given that until 
recently, as much as the board has been a gentlemen club, it also has been 
predominantly Anglo Saxon-centric (Harjoto et al., 2015). Consistent with 
the recent surging interest on the issue of board diversity (Ferreira, 2010; 
Sweigart, 2012; Deloitte, 2015), this study includes nationality mix as one of 
the controls for governance in attempt to examine its monitoring potential. 
257
CEO’S GENDER, POWER, OWNERSHIP
Prior research finds that greater team diversity can lead to better than 
average stock performance (Ferreira, 2010; Deloitte, 2015). Deloitte (2015) 
defines board diversity as an optimal mix in dimensions of skills, expertise 
and experience. Compared to the definition of board diversity provided by 
Deloitte (2015), the proxy used in this study seems insufficient. However, 
due to limited data, this study is restricted to using only one proxy that is, 
nationality mix ratio to represent board diversity. Since board diversity has 
been argued to inspire healthier dynamic to the traditional board mix thus, it 
is expected for it to have positive monitoring effect by reducing audit report 
lag. Other than board size and board diversity, board independence is also 
been considered as one of the governance controls initially, but because of 
the multicollinearity problem it has been dropped from the main model. 
The third category of the control variables are concerning risk factors 
arising from auditor-specific attributes. Bamber et al. (1993) argue that 
audit report lag reflects the extent of auditors’ efforts, resources used in the 
audit and whether or not the auditor is using structural approach. Among 
auditor-specific factors, which have been well established by prior research 
for their influences on audit report lag are auditor reputation -the Big Four, 
auditor tenure, audit change, non-audit services, going concern opinion, 
restatement and audit peak season (Ho-Young et al., 2009). Ho-Young et 
al. (2009) examine audit tenure and non-audit service in detail, and they 
find that audit report lag is decreases as the audit tenure and non-audit 
service increases.
Table 1: Variables Definition
Dependent Variable:
AUD_LAG =
The number of days between the firm’s financial 
year end and the signing of the 
audit reports.
Independent Variables:
GENDER = 1 if the CEO is female and 0 otherwise.
POWER:
   1) IND_EXP * = 1 if the CEO has 5 years industrial experience or more in the firm and 0 otherwise.
   2) NETWORK_SIZE = The size of the CEO’s network.
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OWN * = 1 if the CEO has 5 per cent ownership and more in the firm and 0, otherwise.
Control Variables:
ROA = Positive net income divided by total assets.
LOSS = 1 if the firm has losses and 0 otherwise.
INVREC = Total of inventory and accounts receivable divided by total assets.
BOARD_SIZE = The number of directors sit in the firm’s board.
BOARD_DIVERSITY = Proxy by the nationality-mix ratio
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor is Big 4 and 0 otherwise.
AUD_CHANGE = 1 if the firm is having auditor change during year t and 0, otherwise.
LN_NAS = Natural logarithm of non-audit fees divided by audit fees.
AUD_TENURE = Number of audit tenure in years.
AUD_CHANGE = 1 if the firm is having auditor change during year t and 0 otherwise.
LnNASFee = Natural logarithm of non-audit fees divided by audit fees.
AUD_TENURE = Audit tenure in years.
G_CONCERN = 1 if the firm received going concern opinion.
RESTATE = 1 if the firm has restatement issued during t, and 0 otherwise.
BUSY_SEASON = 1 if the financial year-end is between November 30 and Mac 31, and 0 otherwise.
IND = GICS industry indicator variable (2 digit).
YEAR = Year indicator variable.
This table defines the variables included in the empirical model (1), which estimates the relationship between the CEO’s 
gender, power and ownership concentration and audit report lag.
*IND_EXP is sometimes is presented as IND_EXP (≥5YR) and OWN as OWN (≥5pct) for better understanding.
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RESULTS & DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 describes the distribution of the sample firms for the variables 
of interest of the study using summary of median statistics. The use of 
median statistics in the sample distribution presentation is consistent with 
the use of median regression (or quantile regression) in the analyses of 
this study. In overall, the firms have shorter audit report lags as low as 30 
days prior to 2006. In 2004 and 2005, most firms have high audit report 
lags, between 65 - 66 days. From 2006 – 2014, the range of audit report 
lag is between 56 - 58 days. These numbers indicate that large majority of 
the firms in the sample have relatively good record of audit report lags. In 
respect of the distribution of the CEO’s gender, it is largely dominated by 
the male CEO. As for the industrial experience, the distribution indicates 
that most firms only have CEOs with more than 5 years’ experience starting 
2010 (with the exception to 2005). The statistics of network size show 
that the CEOs generally have larger network size except for 2000. In the 
distribution of the CEO’s ownership the trend shows that majority of the 
CEOs do not have shareholdings of 5 percent and more after 2009. This is 
probably linked to the global financial crisis in 2010, which seen a stricter 
monitoring.
Table 2: Summary statistics of Median – Variables of Interest by Year 
YEAR AUD_LAG GENDER(F=1, 1=0)
IND_EXP
(≥5YR)
NETWORK
SIZE
OWN
(≥5pct)
2000 30.00 0.00 1.00 58.00 1.00
2001 35.00 0.00 0.00 542.00 1.00
2002 38.00 0.00 0.00 527.50 1.00
2003 46.00 0.00 0.00 503.00 1.00
2004 65.00 0.00 1.00 503.00 1.00
2005 66.00 0.00 1.00 499.00 1.00
2006 59.00 0.00 1.00 504.00 1.00
2007 59.00 0.00 0.00 501.00 1.00
2008 58.00 0.00 0.00 521.00 1.00
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2009 57.00 0.00 0.00 530.00 0.00
2010 56.00 0.00 1.00 541.00 0.00
2011 58.00 0.00 1.00 519.50 0.00
2012 58.00 0.00 1.00 544.00 0.00
2013 57.00 0.00 1.00 550.00 0.00
2014 56.50 0.00 1.00 552.00 0.00
This table presents the summary of median statistics by year for the variables of the interest of the study, which includes the 
dependent variable, audit report lag and the independent variables: gender, industry experience and network size (power), 
and ownership percentage of the CEO. The variable definition is presented in Table 1.
Table 3 presents the summary of median statistics for the variables 
of interest of the study by industry sector. In overall, there is no significant 
difference in the performance of audit report lag across industry sectors. The 
audit report lag is ranging between 55 – 58 days, which are within the 60 
days requirement sets by the US SEC. This distribution on audit lag indicates 
that firms at median, issue timely audited earnings reports. All industries 
have higher participation of male than female CEOs, majority CEOs with 
5 industry experience or more except for Consumer Staple industry, yet 
they are among those with the largest social network size. Other industries 
with large number of network size are the Telecommunication services, 
Utilities, Information Technology, Energy, Industrials and Financials. Most 
of CEOs in Healthcare and Financial sectors are the only CEOS that do not 
own shareholdings of 5 per cent and more.
Table 3: Summary of Median Statistics - by Industrial Sector 
INDUSTRY AUD_LAG
GENDER
(M=1, F=0)
IND_EXP
(> 5YR)
NETWORK
SIZE
OWN
(>5pct)
Energy 57.00 0.00 1.00 571.00 1.00
Materials 57.00 0.00 1.00 487.00 1.00
Industrials 55.00 0.00 1.00 561.00 1.00
Consumer Discretionary 58.00 0.00 1.00 414.00 1.00
Consumer Staple 56.00 0.00 0.00 560.00 1.00
Healthcare 58.00 0.00 1.00 499.00 0.00
Financials 58.00 0.00 1.00 544.00 0.00
Information Technology 58.00 0.00 1.00 588.00 1.00
Telecommunication Services 58.00 0.00 1.00 611.00 1.00
Utilities 57.00 0.00 1.00 617.50 1.00
This table describes the distribution of variables of interest of the study, the audit report lag and the independent variables: 
gender, industry experience and network size (power), and ownership percentage of the CEO according to industry sector. 
The variable definition is presented in Table 1.
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Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of all the variables included 
in the empirical model. Out of 18,921 firm-year observations, the firms 
have audit report lag mean (median) of 58 days (58 days). Most of the firms 
in the sample have a male CEO with industry experience of 5 years and 
more and own shareholdings equals to and larger than 5 percent. Majority 
of the firms have median board size of 9, auditors with 6 years tenure 
and non-audit service fees ratio over audit fees of 0.88, engaged big four 
auditors and have financial year end during the busy season of audit. This 
distribution is consistent with the analysis reported by the prior research 
(Harjoto et al., 2015).
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N St.Dev Min Mean Median Max
AUD_ LAG 18,921 24.56 7.00 57.55 58.00 1,066.00
GENDER 18,921 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00
IND_EXP (≥5YR) 18,921 0.50 0.00 0.54 1.00 1.00
NETWORK_SIZE 18,921 761.70 9.00 768.16 523.00 5,425.00
OWN (≥5PCT) 18,921 0.50 0.00 0.51 1.00 1.00
ROA 18,921 0.14 -5.78 0.03 0.04 1.63
LOSS 18,921 0.37 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00
INVREC 18,921 0.20 0.00 0.26 0.22 0.99
BOARD_SIZE 18,921 2.54 2.00 9.55 9.00 33.00
BOARD_
DIVERSITY
18,921 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.90
BIG4 18,921 0.25 0.00 0.93 1.00 1.00
AUD_CHANGE 18,921 0.19 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00
AUD_TENURE 18,921 3.79 1.00 6.92 6.00 15.00
LN_NAS 18,921 0.08 0.39 0.87 0.88 1.00
RESTATE 18,921 0.34 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00
G_CONCERN 18,921 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00
BUSY_SEASON 18,921 0.50 0.00 0.82 1.00 1.00
This table presents the descriptive statistics of variables, which included in the audit lag model. The variable definition is 
presented in Table 1.
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Table 5 presents the result of pairwise correlation analysis. All four 
CEO’s characteristics, have correlations with audit report lag at significant 
level of 0.1, but only GENDER (F=1/M=0) has a positive association. All 
control variables indicate correlations with strength at the significance level 
of 0.1 except for audit tenure, AUD_TENURE, restatement, RESTATE and 
audit peak season, BUSY_SEASON. All variables including the control 
variables indicating the directions, as identified by prior research (Bamber 
et al., 1993; Harjoto et al., 2015). What interesting is that, audit tenure has 
an inverse moderately strong correlation at 0.54 with the CEOs who have 
ownership concentration of 5 per cent and more. The similar moderately 
strong correlation is also identified between Earning losses, LOSS and ROA 
at 0.52. Another correlation that looks striking, is the correlation between 
BOARD_SIZE and NETWORK_SIZE, which at low correlation at 0.25. 
Mains Analyses 
Table 6 provides the results of the regression analyses for each 
of the independent variables, GENDER, IND_EXP, NETWORK_SIZE, 
OWN and the dependent variable, AUD_LAG. All variables for the 
CEO’s characteristics report significant results except for GENDER. The 
coefficients for NETWORK_SIZE and OWN are significant at the level of 
0.01, and IND_EXP at the level of 0.05. The CEO’s industrial experience, 
IND_EXP and network size, NETWORK_SIZE show negative signs, 
indicating an inverse relation with audit report lag. The dimension of CEO’s 
ownership, OWN reports a positive association with audit report lag. These 
findings in a way provide no support to the hypothesis H1, but provide 
evidence to support the hypothesis of H2 and H3. The analyses also fail to 
support studies, which have documented evidence of the positive influence 
of female leaders (Lakhal et al., 2015; Azmat, 2019). Though, the results on 
the CEO’s gender in this study might be influenced by the asymmetrically 
low number of female CEOs as compared to the number of male CEOs. 
Turning to the control variables, the analyses show that all control 
variables except audit change, AUD_CHANGE show significant associations 
with audit report lag consistent with the results from prior research (Harjoto 
et al., 2015). The going concern opinion, G_CONCERN is positively 
associated with audit report lag with the highest coefficient of 12.8 
(maximum) and significant at the level of 0.01. This finding supports prior 
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research such as by Ashton et al. (1987) and studies that examined data in 
2000s for example, (Ho-Young et al., 2009; Harjoto et al., 2015). Ashton 
et al. (1987) finds evidence that going concern opinion is more likely to 
increase audit report lag. 
Next control variables that have strong associations with audit lag are 
the profitability indicator, ROA, earnings losses, LOSS, audit complexity 
as proxied by INVREC, the big four auditors, BIG4, non-audit services 
ratio, LN_NAS, audit peak season, BUSY_SEASON and board diversity, 
BOARD_DIVERSITY. The BOARD_DIVERSITY has a negative coefficient 
that concentrates around -2.00 at significant level of 0.001, which is equally 
as strong as the positive coefficient reported by LOSS. The result indicates 
that as LOSS increases audit report lag, that equally as much BOARD_ 
DIVERSITY reduces audit report lag. This suggests the potential of exploring 
board diversity factors in future research for obtaining understanding of its 
role in governance dynamic.
Other control variables that are showing significant, but relatively 
weaker associations with audit report lag are audit tenure, AUD_TENURE, 
restatement, RESTATE and board size, BOARD_SIZE. Audit change, AUD_
CHANGE in particular, is only significant and seems to increase audit report 
lag when being regressed under the model that is using industrial experience, 
IND_EXP. Majority of the results reported in this study provides support 
to several literature works who find similar evidence such as (Schwartz & 
Soo, 1996; Ho-Young et al., 2009). 
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Table 6: Median Regression Results on Individual Variables of Interest
   
   
  (1)
   GENDER
  (2)
  IND_EXP 
(≥5YR)
  (3)
NETWORK_SIZE
  (4)
  OWN 
(≥5pct)
GENDER
 
0.497
(0.391)
IND_EXP (≥5YR)
 
-0.345**
(0.040)
NETWORK_SIZE
 
-0.001***
(0.000)
OWN (≥5%)
 
0.716***
(0.001)
BOARD_SIZE
 
-0.483***
(0.000)
-0.486***
(0.000)
-0.423***
(0.000)
-0.483***
(0.000)
BOARD_DIVERSITY
 
-2.304***
(0.008)
-2.339***
(0.006)
-1.674**
(0.045)
-2.124**
(0.012)
ROA
 
-8.390***
(0.000)
-8.450***
(0.000)
-8.495***
(0.000)
-8.189***
(0.000)
LOSS
 
2.033***
(0.000)
2.000***
(0.000)
2.049***
(0.000)
2.074***
(0.000)
INVREC
 
2.946***
(0.000)
2.755***
(0.000)
2.672***
(0.000)
2.907***
(0.000)
BIG4
 
-3.235***
(0.001)
-3.261***
(0.002)
-2.998***
(0.003)
-3.213***
(0.001)
AUD_CHANGE
 
0.989
(0.138)
1.115*
(0.095)
0.954
(0.173
1.055
(0.124)
AUD_TENURE
 
-0.103***
(0.009)
-0.090**
(0.022)
-0.102***
(0.009)
-0.098**
(0.012)
LN_NAS
 
-3.138**
(0.019)
-3.088**
(0.022)
-1.682
(0.213)
-3.151**
(0.018)
RESTATE
 
0.740***
(0.001)
0.751***
(0.001)
0.665***
(0.004)
0.664***
(0.003)
G_CONCERN
 
12.445***
(0.001)
12.638***
(0.001)
12.822***
(0.000)
12.492**
(0.017)
BUSY_SEASON
 
1.324***
(0.001)
1.267***
(0.001)
1.397***
(0.001)
1.344***
(0.001)
_cons
 
43.392***
(0.000)
43.765***
(0.000)
41.800***
(0.000)
66.277***
(0.000)
Obs. 18,921 18,921 18,921 18,921
R-squared 0.097 0.097 0.099 0.097
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Results Using the Variables of Interest in Combination 
In Table 7, the results report the analyses when the variables of 
interest of the study, the CEO’s characteristics are in combination. The 
most apparent changes are with the CEO’s gender, in which its coefficient 
is gaining significance at the level 0.1. The significance of the CEO’S 
gender in reducing audit report lag is increasing when it is combined with 
the CEO’s social network size and ownership concentration (in this case 5 
per cent and more). The coefficients for the CEO’s characteristics proxies 
as well as the control variables have no marginal difference to what have 
been reported when the variables of interest are regressed as individually. 
The only differences are the changes in R-squared specification, which 
are increasing. This indicates, the CEO’s characteristics serve as better 
predictors for the audit report lag when they are assessed in combination. 
Though, the R-squared specification for the models have improved, these 
are far lower than what have been reported by prior research for example, 
22 per cent (Ho-Young et al., 2009) and 36 per cent (Harjoto et al., 2015). 
Although, Ho-Young et al. (2009) has reported R-squared with 8 per cent 
in one of their models. It is expected that the lack of board indicators has 
reduces the specification of the models used in this study.
Table 7: Median Regression Results When 
the Variables of Interest in Combination
   
   
  (1)
   Combination
GENDER, 
IND_EXP & OWN
  (2)
 Combination 
GENDER, 
NETWORK_SIZE 
& OWN
  (4)
   Combination 
GENDER, IND_
EXP,
NETWORK_SIZE & 
OWN 
GENDER
 
0.556
(0.336)
1.074*
(0.052)
1.064*
(0.067)
IND_EXP (≥5YR)
 
-0.288*
(0.091)
-0.324*
(0.059)
NETWORK_SIZE
 
-0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
OWN (≥5pct)
 
0.783***
(0.000)
0.723***
(0.001)
0.704***
(0.002)
BOARD_SIZE
 
-0.487***
(0.000)
-0.424***
(0.000)
-0.412***
(0.000)
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B O A R D _
DIVERSITY
 
-2.213***
(0.009)
-1.557*
(0.066)
-1.679**
(0.041)
ROA
 
-8.171***
(0.000)
-8.479***
(0.000)
-8.322***
(0.000)
LOSS
 
2.009***
(0.000)
2.036***
(0.000)
1.991***
(0.000)
INVREC
 
2.821***
(0.000)
2.525***
(0.000)
2.485***
(0.000)
BIG4
 
-3.287***
(0.003)
-3.079***
(0.002)
-3.147***
(0.002)
AUD_CHANGE
 
1.065
(0.106)
1.201*
(0.070)
1.207*
(0.069)
AUD_TENURE
 
-0.096**
(0.014)
-0.094**
(0.013)
-0.088**
(0.024)
LN_NAS
 
-3.143**
(0.023)
-1.839
(0.165)
-1.709
(0.214)
RESTATE
 
0.636***
(0.007)
0.693***
(0.004)
0.715***
(0.003)
G_CONCERN
 
12.628**
(0.015)
12.399***
(0.000)
12.610***
(0.000)
BUSY_SEASON
 
1.305***
(0.393)
1.382***
(0.425)
1.414***
(0.420)
_cons
 
36.254***
(0.000)
34.061***
(0.000)
34.083***
(0.000)
Obs. 18,921 18,921 18,921
R-squared 0.097 0.099 0.099
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes
Standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CONCLUSION
Empirical evidence from prior research indicates that certain characteristics 
of the CEO are informative towards determining the risk associated with the 
financial reporting information quality (Bamber et al., 1993; Ho-Young et al., 
2009; Harjoto et al., 2015; Lakhal et al., 2015). Using US sample, this study 
investigates the association between the CEO’s individual characteristics 
and audit report lag. Audit report lag is the number of days elapsed from 
the firm’s financial year end and the date that the audited financial reports 
is signed by the auditor. This study measures CEO’s characteristics using 
three dimensions: gender, power and ownership that are likely to influence 
the perceived risk associated with the financial reporting information 
timeliness and subsequently, audit report lag. Results from the analyses 
provide evidence to support that the hypothesis of the study, which suggest 
there is value to studying the differences in the CEO’s characteristics.
This study provides robust evidence that industrial experience and 
social network size of the CEO improves audit report lag. Gender diversity 
is shown to have no incremental effect on audit report lag unless it is 
combined with other CEO’s characteristics. In combination with other 
CEO’s characteristics specifically, industry experience, social network 
and ownership concentration, female CEOs reduces audit report lag. The 
study also finds that audit report lag is increasing as the CEO’s ownership 
increasing, which fails to support the line of argument that role of managerial 
shareholding in promoting governance quality (Mitra et al., 2012). Further, 
results from the analyses reveal the incremental effect of board diversity 
on audit report lag and subsequently, in accelerating the release of timely 
audited financial reports.  
By examining the CEO’s characteristics association with audit report 
lag, this study contributes to the growing literature of board diversity, 
including gender diversity (Goodstein et al., 1994; Byrne et al., 2005; 
Ferreira, 2010; Harjoto et al., 2015), corporate governance (Manner, 2010; 
Kaplan, Klebanov, & Sorensen, 2012; Mitra et al., 2012; Uygur, 2018) and 
audit research specifically, audit report lag (Schwartz & Soo, 1996; Knechel 
& Payne, 2001; Blankley et al., 2015; Habib et al., 2019). With an increase 
awareness on board diversity and gender diversity, it is expected that the 
data of interest will becoming richer and board dynamic will be a fertile 
area for future corporate governance and audit research.
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